On May 11, 2000, the Security Council confronted one of the most serious challenges ever to face the United Nations. Secretary-General Kofi Annan briefed the Council in an emergency session, “As of this moment, several hundred United Nations peacekeepers – the great majority of them Zambians – are still being detained against their will in various parts of Sierra Leone.” (S/PV. 4139) The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel forces in Sierra Leone abducted first fifty, then 300 U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel during early May 2000. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) had arrived in November 1999 to oversee the Lomé Peace Agreement between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government. As the Secretary-General emphasized, “These are soldiers who came to Sierra Leone not as enemies, but as friends and peacemakers, under the terms of an agreement negotiated and signed by both parties, including Corporal Foday Sankoh on behalf of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)” (S/PV. 4139).
The unprecedented RUF attacks, however, turned peacekeeping into peace enforcement, an initiative that the UNAMSIL was neither designed nor equipped for. Lack of training, funding and organization resulted in a force whose vulnerability threatened U.N. lives and credibility. The crisis endangered United Nations authority and its role in conflict settlement and maintenance of international peace and security. Regarding this threat, the Algerian representative stated that, “after the tragedies of Rwanda and Bosnia, the United Nations cannot afford another failure today. Images of Blue Helmets taken hostage used as human shields or stripped of their weapons and uniforms by gangs of bandits are not acceptable. They are the very negation of all the values that this Organization personifies and a signal to the enemies of peace that the United Nations is not an institution that must always be respected or, if necessary, feared, but that it is a mere scarecrow, unable to make itself felt and command respect” (S/PV.4139).
How did the situation in Sierra Leone reach this point of urgency? In the 1990s, the international community increasingly relied on African regional and sub-regional organizations to extinguish smoldering African conflicts. Reluctance to authorize United Nations peacekeeping forces resulted in efforts that doused the flames with a handful of insufficient initiatives (Berman 3). The disparate crises in countries such as such as Burundi, Ethiopia, the Congo, and Sierra Leone share common legacies of colonialism, corruption and a history of struggle to manage intra-state conflict with insufficient assistance.
The root of the crisis in Sierra Leone, however, lies beneath the surface of the conflict. It lies in the diamond mines of Sierra Leone. As Ibrahim M. Kamara, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the U.N. stated to the Council on July 5, 2000, “The conflict is not about ideology, tribal, or regional differences. It has nothing to do with the so-called problems of marginalized youths or as some political commentators have characterized it, an uprising by rural poor against the urban elite. The root of the conflict is and remains diamonds. The conflict in Sierra Leone is not a civil war, but a rebel war based on brutality, supported by regional, sub-regional, and international surrogates, and more importantly, financed by the illicit trade in Sierra Leone’s diamonds” (SC/6886). From this constant diamond dispute, the RUF rebels emerged in Sierra Leone during March 1991. As the report by the non-profit group Partnership Africa Canada indicates, “The point of the war may not actually have been to win it, but to engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare” (Smilie 1).
Nine years of war have displaced almost half of the 4.5 million Sierra Leoneans, with an estimated 500,000 more of the Sierra Leone population in neighboring countries. At least 50,000 people have died in the conflict so far. Meanwhile, thousands of mutilated victims possess permanent physical reminders of the devastation caused by the fighting between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone. As the president of the Security Council stated on July 17, 2000, “the Council recognizes that there is still much to be done” (S/PRST/2000/24). The Secretary-General stated, “This Organization has made a commitment to the people of Sierra Leone. We now face a test of our resolve to abide by that commitment. More than that, the plight of Sierra Leone and its people has become a crucial test for the fundamental solidarity between peoples, rising above race and geography, which is the most basic guiding principle of this Organization.” (S.PV.4139)
A complex history of coups, countercoups, and corruption fueled by the ongoing struggle over diamond resources destroyed the scenic landscape of Sierra Leone. In 1462, Portuguese explorer Pedro da Sintra sailed down a picturesque peninsula on the West African coast, which he called Serra Lyoa, or “Lion Mountains.” This region, bordered by Liberia, Guinea, and the Atlantic Ocean was rich in resources possessing many diamonds and minerals.
British Colonization 1792 – 1961
The British established Freetown in 1792 as a settlement on the Sierra Leone harbor for freed slaves. Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, became a Crown Colony in 1808, making it the first modern state in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the period of colonial rule, British presence in Sierra Leone created a new cultural group with a mix of English and African influence. Today, RUF fighters still speak Krio, a widely spoken English-based Creole that dates back to this period. Colonization enabled exploitation of the diamond mines Britain started to grant its colonies, including Sierra Leone, independence following World War II.
From Freedom to Failure
1961-1991
In 1961, Sierra Leone gained independence from Great Britain. Sir Milton Margai became the first prime minister, but died just three years later. His brother, Albert Margai, attempted to create a one-party state under the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in 1964. As a result, many Sierra Leoneans rejected the SLLP, leading to the first ever defeat of an incumbent government in post-colonial Africa. During the 1967 election, Siaka Stevens, leader of the All People's Congress (APC), had opposed Albert Margai. Before Stevens could take office, however, the military commander staged a coup. Then a counter-coup established a military government. Another counter-coup in 1968 returned Stevens from exile and restored civilian government. Ten years later Stevens established a one-party state under the APC even though he had opposed the same action by Margai. State-sponsored corruption under Stevens’ seventeen-year rule, illicit diamond mining in particular, destroyed what democracy existed.
Sierra Leone Diamonds
Geologically, diamonds are not exceptionally rare and their economic power lies in the fact that 70 to 80 % of the world’s top quality diamonds run through a group of companies collectively known as DeBeers, which regulates the availability of diamonds to keep prices high (Junger 4). Diamonds were unearthed in the eastern Kono district of Sierra Leone during 1930 (Smillie 1). In 1935, colonial authorities gave DeBeers’ Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) exclusive mining rights over the country and the company raised production levels to a million carats a year. Soon the local Sierra Leoneans realized that instead of working for DeBeers, they could find diamonds on their own. Thousands of illegal miners began digging up river gravel and washing it to find diamonds. When selling diamonds to traders became dangerous, illegal miners smuggled the diamonds across the Mano River into Liberia (Junger 5). By the 1950s, allegedly 20% of the world’s diamonds were smuggled out of Sierra Leone, mostly through Liberia.
During his term as prime minister, Siaka Stevens encouraged illicit mining. In 1971, Stevens created the National Diamond Mining Company. After mining was nationalized, legitimate exports dropped from a high of over two million carats in 1970, to 595,000 carats in 1980 and then to only 48,000 in 1988. Several more Sierra Leonean leaders followed in the wake of Margai and Stevens. Each leader formed a strategic alliance with Lebanese traders who controlled the diamond mines and successively robbed Sierra Leone of its wealth (Traub 3). Consequentially, the Sierra Leone citizens could not benefit from their nation’s diamond assets. In 1985, Major General Joseph Momoh, the military force commander, succeeded the aging Stevens. Due to years of corruption and mismanagement, the economy completely collapsed.
Emergence of the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF)
In 1990, Momoh finally supported a return to multiparty democracy. In the new multiparty system, however, corrupt former APC leaders led most of the parties. In 1991, Momoh joined other nations in the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) to form the military observer group ECOMOG, which intervened in Liberia's civil war.
The RUF surfaced in late March 1991, when guerrillas invaded eastern Sierra Leone from war-torn Liberia. The rebels claimed they were overthrowing a one-party system. The rebel movement became an excuse to loot and kill. The RUF abducted defenseless children and teenagers who had little or no money. As a RUF fighter in his mid-twenties explained, “I took my O-level exams, and I wanted to continue with my education, but nobody would help me…My friend told me that I should join the RUF” (qtd. Traub 4). When he joined RUF leader Foday Sankoh as a fifteen year old, he suddenly had a gun and a group.
Aided by ECOMOG battalions, the small and disorganized national Sierra Leone Army (SLA) tried to defend the government unsuccessfully (“Sierra Leone – Background” 1). Momoh was forced to scrape together an army that even included children. The rebels swept through southern and eastern Sierra Leone in a campaign of terror. Mutilation and amputating the limbs of civilians, the infamous trademark of the RUF, created a horrific statement meant to exploit the ineptitude of the central government to control the RUF. By April 1991, a communiqué from the government of Sierra Leone revealed that former Sierra Leone army sergeant Foday Sankoh had led the rebellion under the RUF (“Chronology of Sierra Leone” 1). In 1992, a military government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Captain Valentine Strasser replaced Joseph Momoh, who had been the ruling president since 1985. Despite the change in leadership, negotiation between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government failed and RUF attacks continued.
During 1992, the government army regained control of the alluvial diamond mining areas in southeast Sierra Leone and pushed the rebels into Liberia. Faction leader Charles Taylor (now President of Liberia after the 1997 elections) allegedly aided the RUF in an effort to gain power. By spring 1995, the rebels, mostly teenagers drugged to fight, approached Freetown. How could the desperate and bankrupt government defend itself? Strasser employed Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African “security firm” which, in reality were hired mercenaries. EO effectively drove out the RUF from Freetown in a week, and then out of the Kono mining district. However, EO did not destroy every rebel base, and its bill to the Sierra Leone government was high.
The Abidjan Accord
In March 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former U.N. official, was elected president of Sierra Leone. The rebels warned Sierra Leoneans not to vote by chopping off people’s hands, but 60 % of registered voters still voted (Traub 4). The Kabbah government and the RUF signed a peace agreement in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivore in November 1996. The Abidjan Accord called for an immediate end to the fighting and established a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. Another military coup of unpaid army officers, led by Major General John Paul Koroma, followed in May 1997 and ruined the agreement. Kabbah fled to Guinea and Koroma, invited the RUF to join the government in a rule marked by atrocities, looting and a national shutdown of all commerce and banking. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces led by Nigerians stormed Freetown in retaliation to an RUF rebel attack, regained Freetown, and returned President Kabbah to office.
While the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo in Resolution 1156 in March 1998, a private British company named Sandline supplied weapons to Kabbah supporters in Sierra Leone. In June 1998, Security Council Resolution 1171 established the United National Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL observers remained under the protection of ECOMOG to document the human rights abuses and monitor disarmament by the RUF.
January 6, 1999 -
Tragedy Strikes Freetown
By early 1999, the Nigerians had lost over a thousand ECOMOG troops and Nigerian leaders pressed Kabbah to enlist other help. Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained, however, that the situation was far too unstable for the Security Council to send a peacekeeping force. While the U.N. devoted a great majority of its time to the situation in Kosovo.
“It was midnight,” said a hotel worker in eastern Freetown, “and I was suddenly awoken by a shot. I thought it was nothing, but almost immediately the shots were everywhere. I ran outside with my family. The rebels were shooting at anyone, killing babies, women, old men. We ran away and hid in the hills” (qtd. Traub 5). The rebels, some who had been fighting since they were eight or nine, destroyed each neighborhood until they reached ECOMOG headquarters. UNOMSIL evacuated. As the rebels made gains, the Nigerian soldiers fought back with intensity. ECOMOG regained Freetown over two weeks that left about six thousand civilians dead, while thousands more had been raped or lost limbs.
The Lomé Agreement
On 7 July 1999, President Kabbah and RUF leader Foday Sankoh signed the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777, annex). Following six weeks of talks in Lomé, the capital of Togo, the RUF, and the Sierra Leone government signed the agreement, which called for a ceasefire in exchange for RUF amnesty and participation in a government of national unity. Articles I and II called for a ceasefire and outlined plans to monitor the ceasefire under UNOMSIL with the government of Sierra Leone, RUF, and ECOMOG. Articles III, IV and V of the Lomé Agreement recognized the RUF as a legal political party, enabled members to hold public office and allowed the RUF to join the government of national unity through cabinet appointments. Article VI reaffirmed the role of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. The agreement assigned Foday Sankoh as Chairman of the Strategic Minerals Commission, which supervises the management of national diamond assets (Article VII.11). The agreement granted a free and absolute pardon to the RUF (Article IX), brought the group into the government, and solidified RUF control of the diamonds. Despite these overwhelming RUF gains, the desperate need for an agreement overrode Kabbah’s reluctance to sign on these terms. After President Kabbah signed the agreement, the Security Council prepared to send troops as peacekeeping missions require this type of commitment to peace from the parties.
UNAMSIL
Security Council Resolution 1270, passed on October 22, 1999, established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to monitor the cease-fire agreement, assist with the disarmament process, protect U.N. personnel, and establish posts at key locations. The Council authorized an initial force of 6,000 troops, however, none of the countries with major peacekeeping experience, including Canada, Australia, Poland, and Fiji wanted to contribute troops. Without the “glue” to hold the force together, UNAMSIL relied on India’s professional army battalion and force commander, Major General Vijay Kumar Jetley, as well as the ECOMOG forces already in Sierra Leone, which included Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Kenya. The RUF attacked the troops upon arrival in December 1999. The Security Council responded by authorizing 5,000 more troops and bolstering the mandate (S/RES/1231).
In
January 2000, Sankoh gave UNAMSIL an unfriendly introduction. "We have no business with you. You are not helping us," he said in a
speech to Kenyan peacekeeping officers.
To the amazement of UNAMSIL, Sankoh called the presence of an armed
peacekeeping force "a threat to the security of our people.” The rebels, who included members of both the
Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, blocked
450 Kenyan peacekeepers from entering the town of Makeni. During February 2000, U.N. monitors recorded
almost daily reports of looting of villages, house burnings, harassment and
abductions of civilians, rape and sexual abuse despite the peace accord.
After continued troop losses, Nigeria withdrew from the force in early May 2000. The loss of Nigerian peacekeeping experience in Sierra Leone weakened UNAMSIL. During May 2000, the RUF fighters took advantage of the weakened U.N. mission and attempted to regain its diamond hold. “Suddenly we were forced into a situation not of peacekeeping, but of war," said the United Nations force commander in Sierra Leone, Maj. Gen. Vijay Jetley "the reason why our U.N. men were taken hostage is because we were using the weapon we know best - negotiation. We did not want to use force. We did not come here for war. It is more difficult to keep the peace than to make war," (Kahler 1). During the May 2000 crisis, Security Council resolution 1299 of May 19, 2000 authorized a maximum strength of 13,000 military personnel for UNAMSIL, making it the largest U.N. peacekeeping force ever.
On July 5, 2000, acting under the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council imposed a ban on the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone (S/RES/1306). Meanwhile, the Secretary-General ordered a successful rescue mission of more that 200 UNAMSIL peacekeepers at Kailahun, in eastern Sierra Leone (SC/6891). The president of the Security Council stated that, “The Council believes that there is now a firm foundation on which UNAMSIL can build as it continues to implement its mandate and work towards a lasting settlement in Sierra Leone. While noting these positive developments, the Council recognizes that there is still much to be done, and expresses its full support of UNAMSIL in its efforts to implement its mandate” (S/PRST/2000/24).
Despite recent international attention the situation in Sierra Leone remains a threat to international peace and security that extends into neighboring Liberia and Guinea. Adherence to the Lomé Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, remains an essential unachieved goal. According to Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch, deliberate and arbitrary killings, mutilations, rapes, and abductions continue. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has emphasized that RUF leader Foday Sankoh must be brought to justice for the atrocities he committed, such as the mutilations and the abduction of children—who were reportedly drugged before fighting—into the RUF. The Sierra Leonean Government has asked the U.N. to try Sankoh for crimes against humanity.
As the Secretary-General stated to the Security Council in May 2000, “Ultimately, a lasting resolution of the crisis can only be found through political means, it cannot be imposed by military force alone. Nor can a solution be the result of international involvement alone. The Government of Sierra Leone has particular responsibility to actively design and implement the necessary steps towards peace in consultation with its regional and international parties…Looking back on recent events, it is obvious that the United Nations will have to draw from its experiences in Sierra Leone.” (S/200/455)
The Security Council will face new developments in Sierra Leone regarding the status of the Lomé Agreement, the diamond embargo, the RUF, Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh. The Security Council should consider the current situation with regard to the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, possible prosecution of Sankoh, the implementation of the latest diamond ban and the UNAMSIL mandate, while learning from past lessons in Sierra Leone to reevaluate peacekeeping in Africa.
Does your nation possess economic or political interests in Sierra Leone? Why or why not? Has your country been involved in peacekeeping efforts in Africa during recent years? What is your policy regarding the recent issues before the Security Council on Sierra Leone, including the UNAMSIL mandate, prosecution of the RUF, and diamonds? What does your country propose as a short-term remedy to end, for example, the kidnapping and abuse of U.N. personnel? What other action, if any, does you nation support to alleviate the conflict? Using Sierra Leone as an example, how does your nation feel Security Council peacekeeping measures could be improved? It is obvious that the actions the U.N. takes in dealing with the situation in Sierra Leone will determine the future reputation of U.N. peacekeeping and the U.N.’s role as a whole. What do you propose the U.N. does to rectify the situation for the long-term? Can a long-term solution save the U.N. an exorbitant amount of money and resources in the long-term if dealt with now?
S/RES/1132 (1997). 8 October 1997.
S/RES/1156 (1998). 16 March 1998.
S/RES/1162 (1998). 17 April 1998.
S/RES/1171 (1998). 5 June 1998.
S/RES/1181 (1998). 13 July 1998.
S/RES/1220 (1999). 12 January 1999.
S/RES/1231 (1999). 11 March 1999.
S/RES/1245 (1999). 11 June 1999.
S/RES/1260 (1999). 20 August 1999.
S/RES/1270 (1999). 22 October 1999.
S/RES/1289 (2000). 7 February 2000.
S/RES/1299 (2000). 19 May 2000.
S/PRST/2000/14. 4 May 2000
S/PRST/1999/13. 15 May 1999
S/PRST/1999/1. 7 January 1999
S/PRST/1998/13. 20 May 1998
S/PRST/1998/5. 26 February 1998
S/PRST/1997/52. 17 November 1997
S/PRST/1997/42. 6 August 1997
S/PRST/1997/36. 11 July 1997
S/PRST/1997/29. 27 May 1997
S/PRST/1996/46. 4 December 1996
S/PRST/1996/12. 19 March 1996
S/PRST/1996/7. 15 February 1996
http://www.africa-confidential.com/special.htm
http://www.sierra-leone.org
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/slindex.htm
http://www.diamondnews.com/
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/UnamsilF.htm
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/UnamsilD.htm